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STORIES OF CRIMES, TRIALS, AND
APPEALS IN CIVIL WAR ERA MISSOURI
FRANK O. BOWMAN, III*
I. A LYNCHING IN BOONE COUNTY
Near dark on Friday, August 12, 1853, in Columbia, Missouri, Miss
Nancy Hubbard, a fifteen-year-old white girl, was returning from a funeral
with her older married sister, Mrs. Mary Jacobs, and her little daughter
Amanda.1 Miss Hubbard dismounted from her horse to open a gate when, so
she said, a completely naked black man jumped out of a thicket and attempted
to rape her. 2 According to Miss Hubbard, she struggled with her attacker for
ten minutes and succeeded in fighting off the assailant, who fled. The
commotion spooked Mrs. Jacobs‘ horse, which threw her and her daughter.
The daughter ran to the house of a neighbor, who dashed to the scene to find
Miss Hubbard and Mrs. Jacobs, but no assailant. 3 The locals seized and then
released a number of black men as suspects before settling on Hiram, a slave,
as Miss Hubbard‘s attacker.4
Hiram was brought before two local justices of the peace, John Ellis and
Walter C. Maupin, 5 who sat in Cedar Township, 6 a section of Boone County

* Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor of Law. This Article could not have been
written without the laborious digging in historical sources performed by my tireless research
assistants, Bradley Dixon, Mark Ellebracht, Michael Henderson, Michael Spillane, and Scott Snipkie,
as well as the resources and advice provided by John Dethman of the University of Missouri Law
Library and the staffs of the Missouri State Archives and the Western Historical Manuscripts
Collection at the University of Missouri.
1. WILLIAM F. SWITZLER, HISTORY OF BOONE COUNTY, MISSOURI 371 (St. Louis, Nixon–
Jones Printing Co. 1882); see also NORTH TODD GENTRY, THE BENCH AND BAR OF BOONE COUNTY
MISSOURI 253 (1916).
2. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 371. Ever since I first read about this incident, the victim‘s
account of the assault has seemed highly implausible. Even supposing a black man in pre-Civil War
Missouri were to be suicidal enough to attempt the rape of a white girl in the daytime in front of
witnesses, the claim that the attacker was lurking in the bushes in the nude takes the affair from the
deeply improbable to the completely fantastic. Whatever the truth, the white community of
Columbia took Miss Hubbard‘s tale in deadly earnest.
3. Id. at 371–72.
4. Id. at 372.
5. Id.
6. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 72 (identifying Ellis and Maupin as justices of the peace for Cedar
Township).
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just south of Columbia proper.7 The JPs conducted a factual inquiry,
characterized in one source as a ―trial,‖8 and discharged Hiram.9 However,
the citizenry was not satisfied with that outcome, and on Tuesday, August 16,
1853, someone obtained and executed a warrant for Hiram‘s arrest from
Justice of the Peace Thomas Porter, 10 who sat in Columbia Township.11 On
Saturday, August 20, Hiram appeared in the Columbia courthouse before yet
another justice of the peace, David Gordon, and Columbia Recorder
Francis T. Russell. 12 Although again called a ―trial‖ by lay chroniclers of the
period, 13 it is unclear whether the courthouse proceeding was a trial on the
merits or only a probable cause hearing. A felony charge, even when brought
against a slave, was not cognizable by a justice of the peace and could only be
tried on the merits by the circuit court judge, 14 who at the time was William
A. Hall. 15 However, if the charge against Hiram was limited to attempted
rape, the penalty for attempted rape of a white female by a negro was

7. Illustrated Historical Atlas of Boone County, Missouri (1875), reproduced on inside cover of
SWITZLER, supra note 1.
8. See id. at 372. It is not clear what sort of legal proceeding Justices Ellis and Maupin
conducted. If the offense suspected was a felony, justices of the peace lacked jurisdiction to try such
a case on the merits. See Justices‘ Courts §§ 2, 9, Mo. Rev. Stat. 372–73 (1835). But see infra notes
16–17 and accompanying text on the question of whether the charges against Hiram would have
constituted a felony. Justices of the peace were empowered to issue arrest warrants and to examine a
person accused by warrant of a felony and the evidence against him to determin e whether probable
cause existed to bind him over for trial. Justices‘ Courts §§ 3–5, Mo. Rev. Stat. 372–73 (1835)
(authorizing justices of the peace to issue warrants for criminal offenses); §§ 8–9 (setting forth the
procedure for examining a defendant and evidence against him to determine whether the defendant
should be bound over for trial in the circuit court). No warrant had been issued for Hiram‘s arrest at
the time, so the proceeding may have been a sort of informal hybrid essentially aimed at determining
whether probable cause existed to hold and charge Hiram.
9. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372. An interesting sidelight on the weakness of the case against
Hiram appears from the fact that Justice of the Peace Ellis was ousted from his office in 1861 for
refusal to take the required oath of loyalty to the Union. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 265. One may
reasonably assume that he was not a secret abolitionist or disposed to be unduly generous in his
assessment of charges against the town‘s slave population.
10. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372.
11. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 73.
12. Switzler characterizes Gordon as a justice of the peace and Russell as recorder of
Columbia, SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372, but both men were justices of the peace of Columbia
Township at one time, GENTRY, supra note 1, at 73. David Gordon later served five terms as a
county court judge, beginning in 1863; he died in office in 1875. Id. at 67. Francis T. Russell was a
substantial citizen of Columbia. Among other things, he served as a curator of the University of
Missouri and was integrally involved in creating a faculty of law at the university. SWITZLER, supra
note 1, at 231, 298, 300.
13. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372.
14. See supra note 8; see also State v. Gilbert, 24 Mo. 380, 381 (1857) (noting that, while a
misdemeanor charge against a slave is triable by a justice of the peace, a felony proceeding against a
slave must be instituted by indictment in the ordinary way).
15. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 62.
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castration rather than death or imprisonment, 16 and the Missouri Supreme
Court had held in 1844 that this crime was not a felony. 17 Whatever the
technical character of the proceeding, both defendant Hiram and the State
were represented by counsel. Hiram‘s owner, Edward Young, retained
James S. Rollins and Samuel A. Young to represent him. 18 The case was
prosecuted by Odon Guitar.19 Rollins and Guitar, in particular, were or would
later become men of note.
James S. Rollins was born in Kentucky in 1812, and educated in
Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Indiana. He not only ―read law‖ under a
prominent practitioner, but somewhat unusually for the time, also graduated
from a law school. 20 He entered practice in Columbia, Missouri, in 1834, was
elected to the state legislature as a representative in 1838 and 1840, and
served as state senator from 1846 to 1850. 21 He was the (unsuccessful) Whig
candidate for governor in 1848, and the leading (though again unsuccessful)
Whig candidate for U.S. Senate in the same period. 22 By the time of Hiram‘s
arrest in 1853, Rollins had also been a newspaper owner and editor, real estate
speculator, and railroad booster.23 In 1854, Rollins was again elected state
representative, and in 1857 he lost the race for Missouri governor by only 230
votes.24 Although a significant slave owner himself,25 Rollins opposed
extension of slavery to the territories 26 (by no means a popular view in
16. Nathan v. State, 8 Mo. 631, 632 (1844).
17. Id.
18. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372.
19. Id.
20. Rollins attended Washington College, Pennsylvania, for three years, transferred to and
graduated from Indiana University in Bloomington, Indiana, in 1830, read law for two years with a
practitioner, and then attended and graduated from Transylvania Law School in Lexington,
Kentucky, in 1834. Id. at 934.
21. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 51, 53.
22. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935. At the time, U.S. Senators were selected by the state
legislature and not by popular vote. See Senators—United States, ch. 147, § 1, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1460
(1856), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=MTETltYSr-EC&dq=Revised+Statutes+
of+the+State+of+Missouri+1835&source=gbs_navlinks_s.
Rollins‘ candidacy for the Senate
occurred within the legislature and indicated his stature in the legislative wing of the Whig party.
23. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 934; 2 WALTER B. STEVENS, CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF
MISSOURI (THE CENTER STATE): ONE HUNDRED YEARS IN THE UNION 1820–1921, at 801 (1921).
24. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935; WILLIAM BENJAMIN SMITH, JAMES SIDNEY ROLLINS 28
(New York, DeVinne Press 1891). Another source puts the margin of defeat at 334 votes. The Late
Elections in Missouri, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1857, at 4.
25. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 936–37. One source maintains that Rollins held thirty-four
slaves
at
his
home
in
Columbia
in
1860.
Missouri‘s
Little
Dixie,
http://littledixie.net/Slave%20Housing.htm (last visited June 7, 2010). Another claims he was one of
the largest slave owners in the entire state. 2 STEVENS, supra note 23, at 704.
26. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935. Rollins‘ views on slavery were convoluted. He owned
slaves, but seems to have viewed the institution as an evil. He opposed the extension of slavery to
the territories as a matter of policy, id., but appears to have supported the ―popular sovereignty‖
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antebellum central Missouri), and as the threat of southern secession loomed
in 1860, Rollins placed himself firmly in the unionist camp. 27
The tension between Rollins‘ economic interests as a wealthy owner of
real and human property and his allegiance to the federal Union was a
microcosm of the stresses tearing at Missouri generally and Boone County in
particular in the late 1850s. Missouri was the only slave state north of the
Mason–Dixon line and west of the Mississippi. Boone County, situated
roughly thirty miles north of the state capital of Jefferson City and in the
agricultural zone created by the flow of the Missouri River across the state
from Kansas City to its junction with the Mississippi at St. Louis, was a part
of ―Little Dixie,‖ so-called because it was settled primarily by immigrants
from the slave South who brought with them their peculiar institution and the
peculiar culture built around it.28 By 1860, Boone County had the thirdlargest number of slaves among the state‘s 114 counties, with 5,034.29 On the
other hand, Columbia, the Boone County seat, being close to the capital and
home to the state university, was a relatively cosmopolitan place for the time
and its leading citizens were not unaware that the state‘s economic future was
tied just as closely to the urbanizing and industrializing northern states as to
the slave South. When the secession crisis broke in 1861, the governor,
Claiborne Fox Jackson, and the state legislature tried to take Missouri into the
Confederacy. After a series of pitched battles between pro-Union and proConfederate citizen armies, the secessionist governor and legislators were run
out of the state and Missouri‘s allegiance to the Union was precariously
upheld.30

approach of allowing the citizens of each prospective state to choose whether slavery should be
permitted, id. at 381 (recounting the events of an 1855 public meeting in Boone County called to
debate the events in Kansas, in which Rollins supported resolutions endorsing the popular
sovereignty approach of the Kansas–Nebraska Act and opposed resolutions that, in effect, supported
extension of slavery into the territories regardless of the views of the inhabitants). A possible
indicator of Rollins‘ personal views on slavery is an 1860 letter to William F. Switzler in Rollins‘
papers, and apparently in his hand, noting that the author is ―opposed to all kinds of human
merchandise‖ and observing that the Founders viewed slavery as a ―cankerous ulcer, baleful to the
body politic where ever it existed,‖ but implicitly defending the constitutional right of states to adopt
or reject slavery within their own boundaries. Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, University
of Missouri, Collection No. C1026, file 191 (on file with author).
27. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935.
28. T.J. STILES, JESSE JAMES: LAST REBEL OF THE CIVIL WAR 10–11 (2002).
29. Slaves in Missouri in 1860, HOWARD COUNTY ADVERTISER, Jan. 9, 1903, available at
http://www.usgennet.org/usa/mo/topic/afro-amer/slavesinmo.html. Howard County, which adjoins
Boone to the west along the Missouri River, had the second-largest slave population in 1860, with
5,886. Id.
30. This two-sentence summary of the events in Missouri at the outset of the Civil War is a
tremendous oversimplification of a complex history. For the full story, see 3 WILLIAM E. P ARRISH,
A HISTORY OF MISSOURI 1–86 (1973).
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In 1860, Rollins, a unionist Whig, was elected to the first of two terms in
the U.S. House of Representatives, serving from 1861 to 1864.31 After the
Civil War, he returned to civic activism and state politics, securing election to
the Missouri state senate in 1868. 32 While there, he was instrumental in
ensuring that the University of Missouri, which opened in 1841 but had fallen
on hard times during the war,33 would remain in Columbia.34 As a result,
Rollins is known as the ―Father of the University of Missouri.‖ 35 Throughout
his long, successful, and lucrative career,36 Rollins continued to practice law
in both criminal and civil matters, though he was known to fret that the
routine of law practice did not give adequate scope to a man with broad
interests and ambitions.37
Odon Guitar, Hiram‘s prosecutor, was fifteen years younger than Rollins,
having been born in Madison County, Kentucky, in 1827.38 His parents
moved to Boone County, Missouri, when he was two, and Guitar lived in
central Missouri for the rest of his life. He graduated from the University of
Missouri in 1846, departing even before his degree was conferred to join
American forces in the Mexican War. 39 Upon his return, Guitar read law with
his uncle, John B. Gordon, 40 and was admitted to the bar in 1848. 41 Like
many young lawyers, Guitar sought to gain experience and a reputation by
serving as a prosecutor. In 1852, he became the Boone County attorney,
succeeding Rollins, and he held that office when Hiram was arrested. 42 Like
Rollins, Guitar was both a slaveholder 43 and an ardent unionist.44 When the
31. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 935, 937.
32. Id. at 937; see also GENTRY, supra note 1, at 53.
33. See JAMES OLSON & VERA OLSON, THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI: AN ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY 6–7 (1988).
34. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 937.
35. OLSON & OLSON, supra note 33, at 3 (describing Rollins‘ contributions to the rescue of the
university and noting that in 1872, the board of curators of the university recognized him formally as
―Pater Universitatis Missouriensis‖).
36. In 1858, Rollins had the second-highest tax bill in Boone County, second only to Eli Bass.
By 1881, Rollins was the largest taxpayer in the county. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 392.
37. ―Major Rollins, of Boone County, was a member of the bar, but, like [Thomas Hart]
Benton, preferred political to a professional life . . . .‖ John W. Henry, Personal Recollections, in
THE HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI 388 (A.J.D. Stewart ed., St. Louis, The Legal
Publishing Co. 1898) [hereinafter BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI].
38. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877.
39. Id.
40. Id. Gordon was a prominent Columbia attorney who served five terms in the Missouri
legislature. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 51.
41. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877.
42. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 54. James Rollins was Boone County attorney from 1848 to
1852. Guitar took over the office in 1852 and held it until the middle of the Civil War in 1863. Id.
43. Guitar is said to have owned seven household slaves in 1860. Missouri‘s Little Dixie,
supra note 25.
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war broke out, Guitar was commissioned by the unionist governor, Hamilton
Gamble, 45 to recruit a regiment of volunteers for federal service. He became,
in effect, the military commandant of central Missouri (and sometimes of
other sections), and by the close of the war held the rank of brigadier general
of volunteers and of the Missouri State Militia. 46 After the war, General
Guitar (as he was ever after called) returned to law practice, and served two
terms in the Missouri legislature.47 Guitar‘s private practice was primarily
criminal, and he seemed to have a particular affinity for murder cases. He is
reputed to have defended over 140 homicides, and several sources claim that
only one of his clients was ever hung, and only five ever went to prison. 48 We
will discuss one of his few failures presently. 49
On Saturday, August 20, 1853, when Hiram was brought to court, the
courthouse was packed with agitated spectators and a crowd had gathered
outside. At about 3:00 p.m., some of the people outside rushed the courtroom
and tried to drag Hiram out to hang him. They got a rope over his neck,
which Rollins managed to cut once, but another was put around him and he
was dragged out to a nearby wood. Rollins followed the mob, stood before
them, and implored them to return Hiram to official custody for a fair trial. 50
Such was his eloquence that, amazingly, the mob gave the defendant back to
the sheriff.51
44. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877.
45. 3 PARRISH, supra note 30, at 31 (describing Gamble‘s appointment as Missouri governor in
1861 by a state convention).
46. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877–78. See also THE BENCH AND BAR OF ST. LOUIS, KANSAS
CITY, JEFFERSON CITY, AND OTHER MISSOURI CITIES 221 (Chicago, Am. Biographical Publ‘g Co.
1884) [hereinafter BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES].
47. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 878.
48. Id. at 879; BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES, supra note 46, at 221. However, this
version of Guitar‘s record seems to involve a little selective counting. We know of at least four men
he represented who were hung—John Chapman, a white man whose case we will consider presently,
see infra Part II.B, Joe Robinson, a slave executed for murder in 1857, see SWITZLER, supra note 1,
at 388, and the Underwood brothers, tried and executed in Macon County in 1873, see 4 STEVENS,
supra note 23, at 279. Perhaps since Mr. Robinson confessed and had ―no defence to make,‖
SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 388, the chroniclers only counted clients who went to trial, or more
distressingly, as a slave, perhaps Robinson simply was not considered a real client. As for the
Underwoods, it may be that the events in Macon County made little impression on Guitar‘s admirers
back home in Columbia. Still, everybody agreed that Odon Guitar was a great criminal defense
lawyer.
49. See infra Part II.B.
50. Rollins‘ appeal to the mob was apparently supported by William Switzler, the editor of the
Weekly Missouri Statesman newspaper, as well as several other prominent local citizens. See Negro
Hung for Attempted Rape, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, Aug. 26, 1853, at 3.
51. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 372–73. A rather different account of the affair appears in
GENTRY, supra note 1, at 117. Gentry relates the story of the mob storming the courtroom, Rollins
cutting the rope, his appeal to the mob, and the initial return of the prisoner to jail. However, he
bowdlerizes the story‘s ghastly end by reporting that, due to Rollins‘ eloquent intervention, mob
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The next day, Sunday, August 21, while in custody, Hiram—according to
period accounts—confessed. 52 Monday the trial resumed, but the confession
had the perverse effect of increasing mob agitation for summary justice.
Odon Guitar, the prosecutor, and Rollins‘ co-counsel, Colonel Samuel Young,
addressed the crowd, appealed for calm, and urged them to do whatever they
were going to do ―decently and in order.‖ 53 They may also have urged the
mob to disperse, but if so, that part of their plea does not come down to us.
So, outside the courthouse, the mob convened a meeting and, incredibly,
elected a chairman, Eli Bass, one of the largest plantation owners and
slaveholders in Boone County. 54 The question before the meeting was not
whether Hiram should be killed, but how—should he be hanged or burnt? 55
Mr. Bass put the question to a vote. Those in favor of hanging prevailed by a
large margin. The mob then appointed a committee, chaired by George N.
King,56 charged with securing a rope, a cart, and a coffin, and with breaking
into the jail to remove the prisoner and hang him ―decently and in order.‖ 57
Over the protest of the sheriff, they did so, took Hiram to a nearby grove and

violence was averted. It was, but only temporarily.
52. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 373. One is suspicious of this highly convenient confession and
disposed to wonder what methods were employed to secure it. Even in antebellum Missouri, a
confession obtained by force, even from a slave, was inadmissible evidence. Hector v. State, 2 Mo.
135, 136 (1829) (excluding a confession to burglary obtained from the defendant, an AfricanAmerican slave, by flogging him).
53. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 373.
54. Id. In his account of the affair, Switzler refers to Bass as ―one of our most respectable and
influential citizens.‖ Id. Bass owned large tracts of land south of Columbia, considerable livestock,
id. at 747, numerous slaves, and was in 1858 the largest taxpayer in Boone County, id. at 392. He
was arguably the leading citizen of Boone County and of prewar central Missouri. For example, he
was on the first Board of Curators of the University of Missouri in 1839. Id. at 261. During the war,
Bass‘s political views seem to have shifted to accommodate changing military and political tides. He
appeared at a pro-secessionist meeting in April 1861, id. at 405, but in a unionist meeting on July 18,
1863, Switzler commended Bass‘s vote at the Missouri state convention in favor of emancipation of
the slaves in Missouri, id. at 432.
55. Id. at 373. Burning slaves accused of crimes against whites was apparently the brutal
fashion of the time. On August 12, 1853, the same day the attempted rape of Miss Hubbard allegedly
occurred, a Columbia newspaper reported that the citizens of Carthage, Missouri, had seized from the
sheriff‘s custody two slaves convicted of killing a white man, taken them into the countryside, and
burned them. See Negroes Burnt at Carthage, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN , Aug. 12, 1853, at 3.
56. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 373. We know little about Mr. King other than that he left
Boone County to join the California gold rush in 1850, id. at 361–62, but he had apparently returned
by 1853. Given the prevalence of vigilantism in the gold camps, perhaps King brought his
enthusiasm for mob law back with him from California. Remarkably, we also know the names of the
other members of the duly appointed lynching committee, which were published in the local
newspaper. They were Henry Wilkinson, John Ballinger, William Breakey, William B. Cato, John
Robinett, John Hume, William Hubbard, A.R. Vest, and R.P. Waters. Id. at 374; Negro Hung for
Attempted Rape, supra note 50.
57. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 373.
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hung him. 58
Obviously there would be no appeal for Hiram, at least in the courts of
this world, so why does an article in a symposium devoted to criminal appeals
open with an account of so disgraceful and savage a distortion of the legal
process? The tale serves at least two introductory functions. First, it
illustrates that in Missouri before the Civil War, criminal law was often a very
public business. At least in locally prominent cases, a criminal trial was not
something to be read about in the paper, but witnessed in person. It was not a
sealed-off world of legal professionals. It was news, entertainment, spectacle.
Second, it is worth noting, even in this setting of mob violence, how
important a role a certain subset of the lawyer‘s arts assumed. Lawyers in old
Missouri were public characters. Their forensic skills, their physical
presence, their powers of verbal persuasion, were not only their professional
stock in trade, but were the foundations of their reputations and careers. 59
Notice that, although Rollins failed to save his client in the end, his speech to
the mob convinced them to return their victim, at least for awhile. And
Guitar, too, managed to persuade the mob at least to clothe their violence with
orderly procedure. These were oral advocates par excellence, as well as men
of not inconsiderable physical and moral courage. Of course, they were also
men of their time. Neither was going to lay down his life for the due process
rights of a slave accused of rape. And Guitar‘s plea for, in effect, an orderly
lynching may be thought pretty small beer from the elected prosecutor of the
county. But they were willing to stand against the hysterical bigotry of their
fellows, at least to a point. As their subsequent careers show, the people of
central Missouri valued advocacy of this sort (even if on this particular grim
occasion, one bloodthirsty faction was determined not to be cheated of its
hanging). Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate, for a very long time, oral
advocacy was the dominant mode of legal persuasion even in the appellate
courts of nineteenth-century Missouri.
II. CRIMINAL APPEALS IN ANTEBELLUM MISSOURI
A. The Dearth of Criminal Appeals in Old Missouri
To the modern lawyer, one of the most striking things about midnineteenth-century Missouri criminal practice is that the absence of an appeal
58. Id. at 374.
59. Rollins, in particular, was widely known as an orator and perhaps as a man with his eye
firmly on the main chance.
One nineteenth-century chronicler characterized him as an
―accomplished scholar and orator,‖ and then related the remarks of one of Rollins‘ early teachers,
Judge John F. Ryland, who said that the first letter Rollins learned ―was the letter I, and it would be
the last he would forget.‖ WILLIAM VAN NESS BAY, REMINISCENCES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF
MISSOURI 272 (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas & Co. 1878).
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was not a phenomenon peculiar to trials interrupted by lynchings. To the
contrary, hardly any criminal defendants sought appellate review of their
convictions. Understanding why requires an inquiry into the legal culture,
institutions, and rules of the time.
Missouri became a state in 1821, and by 1860 was the eighth-most
populous with 1.2 million people. 60 But before the Civil War, Missouri had
one appellate court, the state supreme court, which consisted of three judges,
one clerk, and perhaps a couple other employees. 61 It sat in various cities, 62
and had both appellate jurisdiction over every class of civil and criminal case
and ―general superintending control over all inferior courts.‖63 It was
therefore a very busy tribunal. But for a long time it did very little criminal
business. In 1822, its first year of operation, the Missouri Supreme Court
decided only three criminal cases,64 no criminal cases at all in 1823, one in
1824,65 five in 1825,66 none in 1826, and two in 1827.67 In its first ten years
of operation, the court decided only twenty-five criminal matters.68 Four or
five criminal cases a year remained the norm until the late 1830s,69 with the
annual average rising to just shy of eleven by the 1840s.70 By 1859, Missouri

60. Population of the United States (1860), http://www.civilwarhome.com/population1860.htm
(last visited June 9, 2010); see also 3 PARRISH, supra note 30, at 7 (placing Missouri‘s 1860
population at 1,182,012).
61. Laurance M. Hyde, Historical Review of the Judicial System of Missouri (pt. 2), 5 MO.
SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 3, 3 (1993).
62. Originally, the Missouri General Assembly was authorized to establish judicial districts, not
to exceed four, in each of which the supreme court was required to hold two sessions annually. Id.
Thereafter, the legislature periodically changed the required locations for convening the court.
Beginning in 1843, the court convened at least one of its annual sessions in the state capital, Jefferson
City. Joseph S. Summers, Jr., A Home for the Supreme Court, 1 MO. SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 8, 8
(1987).
63. Hyde, supra note 61, at 3.
64. State v. Newell, 1 Mo. 177 (1822); Calloway v. State, 1 Mo. 150 (1822); State v. Bray,
1 Mo. 126 (1822).
65. Journey v. State, 1 Mo. 304 (1824).
66. State v. Bird, 1 Mo. 416 (1825); State v. Cook, 1 Mo. 390 (1825); State v. Logan, 1 Mo.
377 (1825); State v. Douglass, 1 Mo. 374 (1825); State v. Ames, 1 Mo. 372 (1825).
67. Lowry v. State, 1 Mo. 518 (1827); King v. State, 1 Mo. 514 (1827). A third case, Strother
v. State, 1 Mo. 554 (1827), involves a fine against an attorney for contempt of court, but this appears
to be a civil contempt.
68. See generally the first three volumes of the Missouri Reports at 1–3 Mo.
69. In 1835, the Missouri Supreme Court decided only one criminal case, State v. Epperson,
4 Mo. 90 (1835), but by 1839, the court‘s criminal caseload was up to ten: Laporte v. State, 6 Mo.
208 (1839); Page v. State, 6 Mo. 205 (1839); State v. Mitchell, 6 Mo. 147 (1839); Fanny v. State, 6
Mo. 122 (1839); State v. Acuff, 6 Mo. 54 (1839); Nicholas v. State, 6 Mo. 6 (1839); Garret v. State, 6
Mo. 1 (1839); Hilderbrand v. State, 5 Mo. 548 (1839); Porter v. State, 5 Mo. 538 (1839); and Frasier
v. State, 5 Mo. 536 (1839).
70. In 1845, only five criminal cases were decided by the Missouri Supreme Court, see 9 Mo.,
while 1847 saw a decade-high of nineteen, see 10–11 Mo.
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had over one million people living in 114 counties 71 and eighteen judicial
districts,72 but only seventeen criminal appeals, or fewer than one per judicial
district, were decided by its supreme court.73 Not only was the absolute
number of criminal cases low, but criminal matters constituted a tiny fraction
of the overall supreme court docket throughout the prewar period. For
example, in 1859, the court issued written opinions in 213 cases, 74 but the
seventeen criminal appeals decided that year made up only 8% of the total.
Figuring out why this was so requires an understanding of contemporary
criminal procedure, and the economic realities and professional norms of
lawyers, trial courts, and the Missouri Supreme Court. Start with criminal
procedure. From its inception in 1822, the Supreme Court of Missouri had
jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments in all criminal cases brought by
―writ of error.‖75 At common law, a writ of error in criminal cases was a plea
for appellate relief based on, as Blackstone put it, ―notorious mistakes in the
judgment or other part of the record.‖ 76 The examples Blackstone gives of
such mistakes—entering judgment of a felony for conviction of a crime that
was only a misdemeanor, ―not properly naming the sheriff or other officer of
the court, or not duly describing where his county court was held‖ 77—make it
clear that in his day criminal writs of error were designed primarily to correct
technical legal mistakes in pleadings or the entry of judgments, and were not a
vehicle for examining trial errors of the sort that now form the basis for most
criminal appeals. In early nineteenth-century Missouri, appeal by writ of
error probably had a broader potential scope than in Blackstone‘s England,
but it was still aimed at opening to appellate scrutiny only errors manifest on
the face of the record, such as whether a prosecution under a given statute
must be initiated by indictment 78 or might be brought by information, 79 the
proper form of indictments,80 challenges to the jurisdiction of particular courts
71. See List of Counties in Missouri, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_counties_
in_Missouri (last visited June 9, 2010).
72. See 1859 Mo. Laws 27 (―An Act to establish the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit . . . .‖).
73. See 27–29 Mo.
74. By contrast, in 2008, the seven judges of the Missouri Supreme Court with all their law
clerks, support staff, and computer technology, issued only 100 opinions.
75. Calloway v. State, 1 Mo. 150 (1822); State v. Foster, 2 Mo. 170 (1830) (noting that the
then-applicable statute made issuance of writs of error ―‗a matter of right‘‖).
76. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *391.
77. Id.
78. State v. Stein, 2 Mo. 56 (1828) (holding that, as a federal constitutional matter, charges of
assault and battery must be brought by indictment).
79. Journey v. State, 1 Mo. 304 (1824).
80. All three criminal appeals decided in 1825 were of this type. State v. Cook, 1 Mo. 390
(1825) (quashing an indictment because the allegation regarding the place where the offense was
committed was written into the margin); State v. Logan, 1 Mo. 377 (1825) (upholding an indictment
for stealing a book against the challenge that it failed to state the title of the book); State v. Ames,
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over particular crimes 81 or to the procedure employed to summon a jury, 82 and
some constitutional questions such as double jeopardy. 83 However, a
moment‘s reflection reveals that errors of this kind represent only a small
fraction of what we would now consider the potentially appealable errors in a
criminal case.
Most of the errors that go the heart of whether a defendant really received
a procedurally correct and substantively fair trial are not discernible merely
from examination of the indictment, the jury rolls, the judgment, and other
formal pleadings. Appeal on the merits presupposes a robust record of the
evidence presented, the legal motions and objections made, the judge‘s
instructions to the jury, and the rulings and reasons of the court below,
accompanied by an enumeration of the supposed errors and the relief
requested. At common law, the enumeration of errors that initiated this kind
of appeal was called a ―bill of exceptions.‖ 84 Bills of exceptions were
prepared by counsel and then endorsed or approved by the trial judge before
transmission to the appellate tribunal. In antebellum Missouri, there was a
series of obstacles to the more complete appellate review afforded by a bill of
exceptions.
First, although bills of exceptions were not unknown in early Missouri
practice—the second criminal case ever decided by the Missouri Supreme
Court entertained arguments brought by a bill of exceptions85—in 1830, the
court held that a bill of exceptions was only available in civil cases. 86 It
reiterated this view on several occasions, 87 until the new procedural code
1 Mo. 372, 373 (1825) (rejecting a challenge to an indictment for illegal gambling on the ground,
inter alia, that it failed to identify the particular game of chance being played); see also Lilly v. State,
3 Mo. 8 (1831); State v. Foster, 2 Mo. 170 (1830).
81. State v. Simonds, 3 Mo. 292 (1834); Wilder v. State, 3 Mo. 291 (1834).
82. Samuels v. State, 3 Mo. 50, 51 (1831).
83. State v. Payne, 4 Mo. 376, 377 (1836) (considering whether a conviction by a justice of the
peace lacking jurisdiction over an offense acts a double jeopardy bar to subsequent prosecution in a
court with jurisdiction).
84. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *372. William G. Hammond, editor of an early
American edition of the COMMENTARIES, described a bill of exceptions as ―embodying all the
evidence and rulings thereon, or so much as is necessary to show the grounds of exception to an
appellate court.‖ 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 523 n.*
(William G. Hammond ed., San Francisco, Bancroft–Whitney Co. 1890). The Missouri Supreme
Court explained that ―the writ of error removes merely the record proper [to the appellate court,
whereas] the bill of exceptions is intended to place upon the record some matter that would not
appear in the regular progress of the cause.‖ Mitchell v. State, 3 Mo. 201, 202 (1833); see also State
v. Wall, 15 Mo. 208, 209 (1851) (holding that where an indictment is quashed for causes not
appearing on its face, the action of the court and its reasons should be made part of the record by a
bill of exceptions).
85. Calloway v. State, 1 Mo. 150 (1822).
86. State v. Henry, 2 Mo. 178, 178 (1830).
87. Vaughn & Vaughn v. State, 4 Mo. 290, 293 (1836); Mitchell v. State, 3 Mo. 201, 202
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enacted in 1835 explicitly guaranteed the right to such bills in criminal
matters.88
The 1835 code (which remained substantially unchanged during the
prewar period)89 specified that all convicted criminal defendants had an
absolute right of appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court,90 and that appeals on
writs of error from such judgments were appeals as of right.91 The law
legislatively overturned the supreme court‘s restrictions on bills of exceptions.
It created a right to a bill of exceptions in criminal cases to the same extent
allowed in civil ones. 92 It also imposed a duty on the clerk of the circuit court
from which an appeal was taken ―to make out a full transcript of the record in
the cause, including the bill of exceptions, judgment and sentence, and certify
and return the same to the office of the clerk of the supreme court.‖93
The effect of the 1835 law was immediately evident in the supreme
court‘s published reports. Beginning in 1836, the reports began to include
much more factual detail about evidence and pre- and post-trial proceedings—
detail that can only have come from the evidentiary summaries and other
components of the record that were necessary to filing a bill of exceptions. 94
(1833).
88. Vaughn & Vaughn, 4 Mo. at 294–95 (―As the law now stands under the revised statutes of
the last session of the legislature, the plaintiffs would be entitled to their bill of exceptions, but this
case originated under the old law.‖).
89. Compare Mo. Rev. Stat. (1835) with Mo. Rev. Stat. (1856). The 1835 procedural code
survived largely unchanged well into the 1870s. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 2986 n.(a) (1879)
(referring to ―the statute of 1835, of which the present statute is almost an exact copy‖).
90. ―In all cases of final judgment rendered upon any indictment, an appeal to the supreme
court shall be allowed, if applied for during the term at which such judgment is rendered.‖ Practice
and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VIII, § 1, Mo. Rev. Stat. 498 (1835) (emphasis supplied). It
appears that this jurisdiction extended to both felony and misdemeanor convictions. Although the
statute refers to judgments ―upon any indictment,‖ suggesting to the modern reader that this
provision would apply only to felonies, it appears that under contemporary practice, both
misdemeanor and felony prosecutions were initiated by indictment. See Practice and Proceedings in
Criminal Cases, art. III, § 22, Mo. Rev. Stat 481 (1835), which prescribes the procedures for
indictments in a ―trespass against the person or property of another, not amounting to felony.‖ Even
before 1835, it appears that some misdemeanors were indictable offenses. See Journey v. State,
1 Mo. 304, 304 (1824) (finding the crime of ―retailing spirituous liquors, without [a] license,‖
punishable by a fine of $100, might be ―an indictable offence‖ if that mode of procedure were
prescribed by the legislature, but that in this case the law prescribed an information).
91. Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VIII, § 2, Mo. Rev. Stat. 498 (1835).
92. Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VI, § 23, Mo. Rev. Stat. 491 (1835); see
also Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, ch. 127, art. VI, § 27, Mo. Rev. Stat. 1193–94
(1856) (reiterating the language first adopted in 1835).
93. Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VIII, § 9, Mo. Rev. Stat. 498–99 (1835).
94. See Vaughn & Vaughn v. State, 4 Mo. 290, 291 (1836) (including the brief of Shannon,
Hunt, and Porter, the defendants‘ attorneys, which noted, ―The record proper, we have brought here
by writ of error, and the bill of exceptions we now have here sworn to, and ask that the same may be
filed as a part of the record‖); Polk v. State, 4 Mo. 544 (1837) (beginning with the parties‘ briefs, and
concluding with the opinion of the court, which describes and rules on the contents of the bill of
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It became common practice for the court to publish the ―briefs‖ of the parties
as an introduction to the opinion of the court.95 And although technical
pleading issues remained common, 96 the range of questions considered by the
court notably broadened to include more challenges based on the sufficiency
of the evidence97 and matters such as the competency, credibility, and
impeachment of witnesses 98 or the correctness of jury instructions given the
facts of a case.99 Nonetheless, despite the increased latitude of issues
cognizable on appeal after 1835, the number of appeals remained small. What
else might have been at work?
One part of the answer may have been that filing an appeal did not stay
the execution of the criminal judgment and sentence unless either the trial
court or the supreme court certified that there was ―probable cause for such
appeal . . . or so much doubt as to render it expedient to take the judgment of
the supreme court thereon,‖100 although a trial judge refusing certification was
obliged to enter a temporary stay of ―sufficient time to make application to the
supreme court‖ for a certification. 101 Absent certification from either the trial
court or the supreme court, the circuit court clerk would prepare the record,
with its bill of exceptions, and the appeal could proceed, 102 but the judgment
would be entered and the sentence—whether the imposition of a fine,
confinement to prison, or execution—would go forward. This procedural
obstacle to full review of a defendant‘s appellate arguments shortened the life
of John Chapman in 1858.
B. State v. John Chapman—An Appeal Stillborn
On Friday, June 29, 1855, somebody shot and killed John C. Denham
from ambush while he was plowing his fields in northeastern Boone
County.103 Suspicion immediately fell on John Chapman, one of Denham‘s
neighbors, but before Chapman could be detained, he fled to Ohio. Roughly a
year later, Chapman imprudently returned, and was discovered and arrested. 104
He was represented by four lawyers—James Rollins and Odon Guitar of
exceptions).
95. See, e.g., id.; State v. Heatherly, 4 Mo. 478 (1837) (beginning with the brief of Wood,
counsel for the defendant, and concluding with the opinion of the court).
96. See, e.g., Porter v. State, 5 Mo. 538, 540 (1839) (concluding that a challenged change of
venue was proper).
97. See, e.g., Frasier v. State, 5 Mo. 536, 536 (1839).
98. See, e.g., Garret v. State, 6 Mo. 1, 1 (1839).
99. See, e.g., Nicholas v. State, 6 Mo. 6, 6 (1839).
100. Practice and Proceedings in Criminal Cases, art. VIII, § 3, Mo. Rev. Stat. 498–99 (1835).
101. Id. § 4.
102. Id. §§ 10–11.
103. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 385.
104. Id.
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Columbia, Jerre P. Lancaster of Ralls, and Andrew Herndon of Howard
County105—a sort of old Missouri dream team. 106 They were opposed by
John F. Williams, then the circuit attorney of the second judicial circuit
(which encompassed both Boone and Howard Counties) and later one of
Guitar‘s military subordinates,107 and Robert T. Prewitt, formerly the second
judicial circuit attorney.108 The defense lawyers engaged in all sorts of legal
maneuvering, including securing a change of venue to Fayette in Howard
County, and conducted the defense with, as an admiring contemporary
described it, ―a zeal and eloquence unsurpassed in criminal trials in the
West.‖109 Rollins was so good that one young lawyer watching the trial
remembered his closing argument forty years later. 110 Nonetheless, Chapman
was convicted on June 11, 1858, and sentenced to hang.111 On June 14, 1858,
Rollins wrote to his son back East:112
105. Id. at 386. Herndon seems to have been a solid, but unspectacular, longtime Howard
County practitioner taken on as local counsel, perhaps to provide knowledge of the local judiciary
and jury venire to the out-of-towners from Columbia. See BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES,
supra note 46, at 244 (characterizing Herndon as ―one of the oldest and most respected lawyers of
Howard county‖). I can find no information about Lancaster, other than his association with this
case.
106. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 386.
107. Id. at 385–86; see also GENTRY, supra note 1, at 54, 64. Williams had received his legal
training from Prewitt. BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES, supra note 46, at 228. During the
Civil War, he sided with the Union and served with, and under, Odon Guitar in the Ninth Cavalry of
the Missouri State Militia. See SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 877 (noting that Guitar raised the Ninth
Cavalry and commanded it until his promotion in 1863 to brigadier general); BENCH AND BAR OF
MISSOURI CITIES, supra note 46, at 228 (noting that Williams helped raise the Ninth Cavalry and
became its colonel in 1863). Williams emerged from the war as a colonel and went on to become
speaker of the Missouri House of Representatives and superintendent of Missouri‘s insurance
department. Id. at 228–29.
108. Prewitt was second judicial circuit attorney from 1852 to 1856, although one source gives
the dates of Prewitt‘s service as 1853 to 1857. BAY, supra note 59, at 533; see also GENTRY, supra
note 1, at 54. He was reputed to be ―a fluent and impressive speaker, but not an orator. His style of
declamation was more conversational than otherwise.‖ BAY, supra note 59, at 535. Another source
called him ―one of the ablest lawyers in that part of the State.‖ Henry, supra note 37, at 389.
109. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 385–86.
110. Writing in 1898, Thomas Shackelford said, ―Major Rollins‘ appeal to the jury surpassed,
in my youthful opinion, anything I ever heard. His impassioned address still lingers in my memory.‖
Thomas Shackelford, Reminiscences of the Bench and Bar in Central Missouri, in BENCH AND BAR
OF MISSOURI, supra note 37, at 398.
111. The article Chapman Convicted, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, June 25, 1858, at 4, reported
that Chapman ―was convicted of murder in the first degree on Friday evening last,‖ which would
appear to put the conviction on June 18, 1858; however, the article was apparently reprinted from the
Fayette newspaper, and we know from a letter by James Rollins that Chapman was convicted prior to
June 14, 1858. Letter of James S. Rollins to James H. Rollins (June 14, 1858), Western Historical
Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, Collection No. C1026, file 191 [hereinafter Rollins
Letter (6/14/1858)].
112. Rollins‘ eldest son was attending the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, from which he
later graduated. BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI CITIES, supra note 46, at 242.
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I returned home last evening from the Howard court, where I
went to defend a man charged with murder. I made a great
speech for him, but to no purpose as the jury found him guilty
and he will be hung next Friday 4 weeks [i.e., four weeks
from next Friday]. Guitar also made for him a splendid
speech besides one or two other gentlemen. 113
Two points in these remarks leap out at the modern reader. The first is the
emphasis Rollins placed on the ―speeches,‖ what we would call closing
arguments, rather than on the evidence. Contemporary newspaper accounts of
the trial provide one hint about why the speeches assumed such a prominent
place in Rollins‘ mind. After prosecutor Prewitt gave a two-hour opening
summation, all four defense lawyers addressed the jury: Lancaster for two
hours, Herndon for three, followed by Rollins, and then by Guitar, whereupon
Circuit Attorney Williams rose in rebuttal.114 Although the lengths of the
orations by Rollins, Guitar, and Williams are not recorded, closing arguments
in the case must have run no less than ten to twelve hours. All the surviving
mentions of the case in the public press describe the oratory, 115 but none says
a word about the facts or legal issues that make up the merits of a case.
The second notable feature of Rollins‘ letter to his son is the obvious air
of resignation to the inevitability of a prompt execution. The letter exudes the
sense that, having given a ―great speech,‖ a defense attorney‘s job was done.
There is no hint that appellate review might even postpone the hanging. Yet
we know that the defense team publicly declared their intention to appeal. 116
And by June 14, the date of Rollins‘ letter, the defense had already filed the
bill of exceptions with the Howard County Circuit Court, whose clerk noted
that the appeal was ―approved.‖117 Nonetheless, as Rollins foretold, the
sentence was carried out four weeks after the verdict, on Friday, July 16,
1858.118
113. Rollins Letter (6/14/1858), supra note 111.
114. Chapman Convicted, supra note 111.
115. According to the press, Prewitt spoke with ―great power and ingenuity.‖ Lancaster led off
the defense ―in an eloquent and searching speech . . . which would have done honor to one of much
longer experience in his profession.‖ Herndon‘s address ―was bold, eloquent, and logical.‖ Rollins
―made one of his finest efforts.‖ Guitar‘s argument was ―an extraordinary one.‖ And Williams
concluded with ―his greatest effort, and he showed himself able to meet the ablest lawyers in the
State.‖ Id.
116. The Fayette newspaper reported, ―We learn that the case will be taken up to the Supreme
Court.‖ Chapman Convicted, supra note 111.
117. State v. John Chapman (1858), microformed on Records of Circuit Court of Howard
County, Missouri, Missouri State Archives, box 23, folder 77, unit 1, rows 5–8, microfilm roll 33860.
According to the clerk, the defense also filed an ―affidavit for an appeal.‖ Id. The function of this
affidavit is not clear.
118. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 386–87; Hung, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, July 23, 1858, at 3;
Execution of John Chapman, WKLY. MO. STATESMAN, July 30, 1858, at 3. Perhaps Rollins‘
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What happened? Why was Chapman‘s execution not at least postponed
by the appellate process? Surely a case that provided grist for ten to twelve
hours of jury argument must have presented at least one substantial appellate
issue. Rollins and Guitar certainly seem to have thought so. They rushed to
file the trial record with the supreme court and in their pleadings enumerated
six grounds for appeal.119 However, so far as can be determined from the
Howard County records, while the trial judge ―approved‖ the appeal, he never
issued a certification that there was probable cause for an appeal, thus
effectively denying a stay and leaving the execution date undisturbed. On
July 8, 1858, Rollins and Guitar filed a motion for stay of execution of the
judgment with the Missouri Supreme Court and asked that the case be set over
to the following term of court.120 The court denied the motion without
comment the following day121 and Chapman was hung a week later, protesting
his innocence to the last.122
The refusal of the Supreme Court to hear Chapman‘s appeal on the merits
is startling, at least to the modern legal sensibility. The case was locally
notorious and Chapman‘s counsel were prominent men, Rollins having come
within several hundred votes of being elected governor only months before.
Moreover, as a review of the trial record makes clear, the evidence against
Chapman, though sufficient to support the conviction, was entirely
circumstantial and hardly unimpeachable. 123 And denying this stay sent a man
to the gallows.
We do not know how common it was for trial judges to decline
certification of cases for appeal or for the supreme court to refuse to grant a
stay, but if certifications and stays were often denied, that practice would have
discouraged pursuit of appellate relief. Indeed, one suspects that the court‘s
summary treatment of Chapman‘s widely publicized case would in itself have
chilled the appellate ardor of Missouri criminal practitioners.

fatalism was the product of experience. Not only had his oratory failed to save Hiram from lynching,
but as a young lawyer in 1836, he defended a slave named Conway on a murder charge and
―delivered an argument of great eloquence and ability‖ that was remembered decades later ―for its
remarkable power and beauty.‖ Conway was convicted nonetheless and hung four weeks later,
despite lingering doubts about his guilt. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 206–07.
119. Motion for Supersedeas, State v. John Chapman (1858), Supreme Court Case Files,
Missouri State Archives, location 16A/6/3, box 227, folder 13.
120. Motion for Stay of Judgment, id.
121. Order Refusing an Application for Supersedeas, id.
122. See supra note 118.
123. According to the record filed with the Missouri Supreme Court, no one saw Chapman
shoot the victim. His conviction was based, inter alia, on testimony that Chapman had threatened the
deceased and others before the murder, that Chapman was seen in the area carrying a rifle at about
the time of the shooting, and some extraordinarily primitive forensic testimony. Record on Appeal,
Chapman, supra note 119.
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C. Other Impediments to Appeals
Available evidence suggests that another significant impediment to filing
appeals in old Missouri was the very process made possible by the 1835 code
reform. Filing an appeal on a bill of exceptions required getting someone to
write out, in longhand, a record of the evidence adduced at trial and of all the
objections and motions and the court‘s ruling on them (or at least all the
objections, motions, and rulings the appellant thought pertinent), as well as
making copies, in longhand, of the indictment, the jury instructions, the final
judgment, and any other official documents that were part of the trial
record.124 Not only were there no electronic means of recording testimony or
copying documents, but in old Missouri, there was no cadre of court reporters
routinely taking notes of everything that transpired in every case. Each circuit
court had a court clerk, who was charged by statute to ―seasonably record the
judgments, rules, orders, and other proceedings of the court,‖125 but the clerk‘s
charge did not include creating a verbatim transcription, or even
contemporaneous notes, of testimony, legal objections, or arguments. One
supposes that at least some clerks assumed responsibility for taking good
contemporaneous notes or delegated that task to a deputy clerk, but there was
no legal requirement that they do so or even that they have any training that
would suit them for the task.126 Accordingly, the creation of the record of
witness testimony and trial proceedings necessary to create a bill of
exceptions seems to have been a retrospective exercise of reconstructing what
occurred once the trial was over, undertaken only if one of the advocates was
contemplating appeal. Moreover, it appears that, at least in many counties, it
was the lawyer contemplating appeal himself who had to write up both the
summary of the evidence, objections, and rulings and the bill of exceptions.
Not until 1887 did the Missouri Legislature pass a law authorizing the
appointment of shorthand reporters in circuit courts. According to Judge
North Todd Gentry of Boone County,
Before 1887, the lawyer or lawyers who lost in the circuit
court prepared the bill of exceptions; and usually did so one
night during that term of court. Old lawyers say that it often
took them all night to write out the testimony; and that no one
thought of taking until the next term in which to prepare the
bill.
But the appointment of a stenographer almost
124. And the job had to be done right for the supreme court to accept that errors were properly
preserved. See Nathan v. State, 8 Mo. 631, 632 (1844) (discussing deficiencies in the bill of
exceptions).
125. Clerks, ch. 26, § 21, Mo. Rev. Stat 338 (1856).
126. In 1855, the sole legal prerequisites for appointment or election as clerk were that the
candidate be free, white, twenty-one years old, a resident of the state for a year, and of the county in
which he would serve for three months. Id. § 10.
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revolutionized the practice. Prior to that, few lawyers
practiced in the appellate courts and few cases were appealed.
But after Miss Matthews 127 learned to prepare bills of
exceptions, appellate practice was simplified and Boone
county lawyers soon became familiar with proceedings in the
higher courts.128
If the difficulty and inconvenience of writing up testimony and bills of
exceptions acted as a barrier to appellate review even for lawyers practicing in
and around a relatively populous county seat like Columbia, the impediment
would have been greater still for the not inconsiderable portion of the bar that
rode circuit. Judge Charles B. McAfee, writing in 1897, recalled that in
southwest Missouri both before and for some years after the Civil War, ―a
lawyer‘s practice was largely away from home, and often embraced several
judicial circuits. The circumstances of those days generally involved an
absence from home of from two to eight weeks and the attorney was in court
almost every day that he was not on the road.‖ 129 A lawyer riding circuit
lacked both the time and convenient facilities for writing up bills of
exceptions in any but the most extraordinary case. Even if a circuit-riding
lawyer took the trouble to arrange preparation of the record and a bill of
exceptions, just ensuring that these documents reached the supreme court
presented some difficulty. For example, Columbia is only thirty miles from
the state capital of Jefferson City, where the supreme court was headquartered
from its inception, but regular mail service between the two cities was not
instituted until 1856.130
Another, seemingly circular, reason for the dearth of criminal appeals was
the dearth of existing appellate law. Between 1822 and 1860, the Missouri
Supreme Court wrote perhaps 550 criminal opinions. This sounds like a
goodly number, but, examined carefully, these cases contained strikingly little
help for the would-be criminal appellant. First, they addressed a very narrow
range of potential issues. As we have seen, for a long time, the court focused
primarily on the technical questions appealable on a writ of error. More
widespread use of bills of exceptions beginning in the late 1830s slowly
broadened the court‘s decisional coverage, but the importance of the advent of
shorthand reporters in 1887—and of their absence before—can hardly be
exaggerated. We assume as a matter of course that a neutral official will
automatically create and preserve a ―record‖ of the precise wording and
127. Laura Matthews was Boone County‘s first official court stenographer. She was appointed
in 1887 and served until 1904. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 63.
128. Id. at 63–64.
129. Charles B. McAfee, Riding the Circuits in Southwest Missouri, in BENCH AND BAR OF
MISSOURI, supra note 37, at 72, reprinted in 6 MO. SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 6, 6 (1998).
130. SWITZLER, supra note 1, at 383.
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sequence of questions, answers, objections, arguments, remarks from the
bench, and rulings in any trial. Such a record is the raw material of the
appellate lawyer‘s trade to be mined in retrospective leisure for evidence of
error. But prior to 1887, even if a lawyer or clerk had the foresight to take
good notes during a trial or a nearly photographic memory upon which to rely
afterward, the trial record was, at best, a summary containing only the basic
thrust and major points of testimony, together with descriptions of the
objections and legal rulings the lawyer taking the appeal thought critical at the
time the record was being prepared. 131 And of course, the federal criminal
procedure revolution with its exclusionary rule was more than a century in the
future so, with only rare exceptions, 132 the conduct of citizens or law
enforcement officials in securing evidence was not a live appellate question.
In short, the number of criminal questions the Missouri Supreme Court had
ever decided stayed small for decades.
Second, even on the questions it addressed, the court‘s opinions were very
short. Prior to the 1835 statute authorizing bills of exceptions, most cases
were resolved in a page or perhaps two. The opinions were not only terse, but
they often did nothing more than announce the court‘s resolution of the case,
with little added in the way of explanation or even citation of authority. 133
After bills of exceptions became de rigueur, the number of pages devoted to
each case in the Missouri Reports increased somewhat, but much of the initial
increase consisted of reprinting all or portions of the summaries of testimony
or the parties‘ briefs 134 as introductions to the opinions of the court, which
themselves tended to remain short.135 By the mid-1850s, the practice of
printing testimonial summaries in full seems to have fallen out of favor,
although the parties‘ briefs were still sometimes reproduced.136 But the judges
remained curt. Of the seventeen criminal cases decided in 1859, thirteen
consume less than three printed pages in the Missouri Reports, everything
included. The overwhelming impression produced by reading its opinions is
that, with occasional exceptions, the early antebellum court conceived of its
131. See, e.g., McMillen v. State, 13 Mo. 30, 32 (1850) (―All the testimony given on the trial is
not preserved in the bill of exceptions, but enough is stated to show the important facts in the case.‖).
132. For an exception, see Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 135, 136 (1829) (excluding a slave‘s
confession to burglary on the ground that it was obtained through flogging).
133. See, e.g., id. The court reversed Hector‘s conviction without reference to any authority
whatsoever.
134. See, e.g., Schaller v. State, 14 Mo. 502, 503–04 (1851) (beginning with the arguments of
Mr. Blennerhassett, attorney for the appellant, and Mr. Lackland, counsel for the state).
135. See, e.g., Fanny v. State, 6 Mo. 122 (1839) (containing an eighteen-page summary of
evidence and testimony, one-half page constituting the appellant‘s entire brief, and a two-page
judicial opinion).
136. See, e.g., State v. Woodward, 21 Mo. 265, 265 (1855) (prefacing the opinion of Judge
Ryland with the brief of Cline and Jamison for the respondent).
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job primarily as resolving the particular disputes before it, rather than as
creating a body of reasoned precedent for the guidance of the trial bench and
bar. This impression is reinforced if one goes into the state archives and
examines the original appellate files (which happily still exist). Even in cases
where the lawyers and scriveners who created the record took some pains to
write clearly, well, and at length, the court‘s opinion is sometimes a nearly
illegible scrawl on a half-sheet of paper.
Not only was the Missouri Supreme Court creating relatively little law in
the criminal field, but the trial bench and bar had difficulty accessing it.
Publication of the court‘s opinions was slow, sometimes involving years of
lag time, 137 and there was no system of advance sheets. Even when collected
in the Missouri Reports, the court‘s opinions obviously could not be searched
electronically and there was, as yet, no equivalent of the West key number
system or the Shepard‘s citator system, which had its beginnings in Chicago
in the 1870s.138 The relative paucity of published opinions probably made
keeping up with new developments in a single field relatively easy, if one had
ready access to the Reports. But few, if any, lawyers could afford to be
specialists. And by 1858, when Rollins and Guitar were crafting an appeal for
Chapman, the Missouri Reports had filled their twenty-seventh volume. 139
Well-to-do town-based practitioners like Rollins and Guitar would certainly
have had their own sets of the Reports ready at hand, but circuit-riding
lawyers and judges could hardly throw twenty-seven volumes in a
saddlebag. 140
The want of written legal authority extended beyond the small number,
narrow scope, and relative inaccessibility of the Missouri Supreme Court‘s
published opinions. Even persuasive authority was at a premium. Most
lawyers owned a copy of Blackstone and a few other basic books,141 but law
137. For example, the second volume of supreme court reports was compiled and published by
a private attorney, Louis Houck, and collected opinions issued from 1827 to 1830. The third volume,
also compiled by Houck, included one 1829 opinion left out of the earlier volume, Tracy &
Wahrendorff v. State, 3 Mo. 3 (1829), followed by cases from 1831 to 1835. 2–3 Mo. (Houck). A
Missouri lawyer practicing in 1835 would have had a long wait for an authoritative volume
containing cases decided four or five years before. By the early 1840s, the lag between issuance of
an opinion and its publication in the Reports was still as much as three years. See, e.g., 7 Mo.
(containing cases from 1840 to 1842 and published in 1843). By the 1850s, the lag was down to
about a year. See, e.g., 16 Mo. (containing 1852 opinions and published in 1853).
138. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 183 (1990).
139. See, e.g., State v. Cross, 27 Mo. 332 (1858).
140. See McAfee, supra note 129, at 10 (recounting an argument before a justice of the peace,
who after hours of disputation, exclaimed, ―‗You attorneys differ so widely about the law and we
have not the books that each of you claim settles the case. So how am I to decide it? If we had the
books, there would be no trouble, as each of you claim, but what am I to do without these books?‘‖).
141. Id. at 7 (noting that Blackstone, Greenleaf (a treatise on evidence), and Chitty (a treatise
on criminal law and procedure) were common sources).
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libraries were rare and sparsely filled. Treatises, statutes, and reported cases
from England and other states were sometimes cited by lawyers 142 or the court
itself.143 But even the court seems to have been surprisingly ill-supplied, at
least in its early days, as it was obliged to confess in one 1831 opinion where
it wrote: ―To prove this, [plaintiff‘s counsel] cites 18 Johnson’s R., 212, and
the authorities there cited. We have not got the book before us, but if we
recollect correctly, the decision is, that a venire is necessary in N[ew] Y[ork];
though they say they cannot see much use in it at this day.‖144
Law begets law. The more law you have, the easier it is to invoke. The
more law is invoked, the more courts and legislatures expand its compass and
fill in its gaps and the easier it becomes to invoke again. For antebellum
Missouri lawyers, the job of pursuing new appeals was made more difficult in
inverse relation to the small quantity of readily accessible existing law upon
which appellate arguments might plausibly be based.
Finally, the small number of criminal appeals in prewar Missouri must
surely have had some relation to economics. There was no system of
appointed counsel for the indigent at trial, and certainly no provision for free
appellate counsel. Then as now, criminal defendants as a class were less
likely to be able to afford lawyers. And even the court costs associated with
an appeal could be significant. The case file of the 1857 case of State v.
McClure145 preserved in the Missouri State Archives contains a long, itemized
bill of costs exceeding $600, which would have been many thousands in
today‘s dollars. If, as appears to have been the case, these costs were taxed to
defendants, the burden could be crippling. 146
We cannot know how many cases were not appealed for lack of funds, but
the prevalence of two types of criminal cases among those that did get to the
supreme court suggests the centrality of cash to the appellate calculus. First,
throughout the antebellum period, a strikingly high percentage of all criminal
appeals were essentially regulatory in character, usually criminal ―dram shop‖

142. Perhaps unsurprisingly, lawyers from the big city of St. Louis seem to have been better
armed with outstate authority. See, e.g., State v. Woodward, 21 Mo. 265, 265–66 (1855) (including
counsel‘s brief citing cases from England, Alabama, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Mississippi, and
Iowa).
143. See, e.g., Hemmaker v. State, 12 Mo. 453, 455 (1849) (citing one English treatise and
cases from Massachusetts, Tennessee, North Carolina, and New York); Whitney v. State, 8 Mo. 165,
168 (1843) (citing cases from New York and Virginia); Mitchell v. State, 3 Mo. 201, 202 (1833)
(citing an English statute).
144. Samuels v. State, 3 Mo. 50, 51 (1831) (second emphasis supplied).
145. 25 Mo. 338 (1857).
146. See Fees, ch. 64, § 11, Mo. Rev. Stat. 449–50 (1856) (enumerating the fees chargeable by
clerks of courts having criminal jurisdiction); id. § 12 (specifying that ―[n]o fee shall be charged by
any clerk, in any criminal case against the State or county, unless it is expressly allowed in the
foregoing section‖).
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cases involving the sale of liquor in violation of state or local ordinance. For
example, of the roughly twenty-five criminal cases decided by the Missouri
Supreme Court in its first two decades, nine were liquor violations. 147 In
1859, five of the court‘s seventeen criminal decisions, or nearly a third, were
dram shop cases. 148 The appellants in these cases were business owners with
both the money and the motivation to resist application of liquor laws to their
premises.149
The second proof of the importance of money to criminal appeals is the
relative frequency of appeals on behalf of criminally convicted slaves, at least
ten of which made their way to the supreme court between 1822 and 1860. 150
These cases highlight the paradoxes of slave society in many ways, not least
among them the oddity of a legal system that insisted black people were
property not essentially different from cattle or sheep, but which afforded
them relatively complete due process rights before convicting and punishing
them for crimes. But for present purposes the key point about these cases is
that their black defendants received the benefit of representation before the
supreme court that poor whites of the period could not afford because slaves
were valuable property. They belonged in law to relatively affluent whites
with the resources and incentive to ensure that their property was not damaged
or destroyed by hanging, castration, imprisonment, or flogging. Recall that,
before the matter was ripped from the hands of the law, Hiram‘s owner
retained for his defense James Rollins, one of the best lawyers and most
prominent men in central Missouri.
The dearth of law affected not only the choice of whether to appeal, but
the way cases were conducted before the supreme court. Characterizing
today‘s massive appellate pleadings as ―briefs‖ always carries with it a certain
mordant humor. But in old Missouri, briefs were brief. They usually
consisted of short declarative statements, the closest analogue to which in
modern practice would be the ―Issues Presented for Review‖ section of a U.S.
Supreme Court brief, plus lists of whatever authorities the lawyer thought
147. Casey v. State, 6 Mo. 646 (1840); State v. Spear, 6 Mo. 644 (1840); Frasier v. State, 6 Mo.
195 (1839); Frasier v. State, 5 Mo. 536 (1839); State v. Hunter, 5 Mo. 360 (1838); State v. Corwin,
4 Mo. 609 (1837); Storrs v. State, 3 Mo. 7 (1831); State v. English, 2 Mo. 147 (1829); Journ ey v.
State, 1 Mo. 304 (1824).
148. State v. Wells, 28 Mo. 565 (1859); State v. Mitchell, 28 Mo. 562 (1859); State v.
Andrews, 28 Mo. 19 (1859); State v. Andrews, 28 Mo. 17 (1859); State v. Andrews, 28 Mo. 14
(1859).
149. A typical case is Wells, 28 Mo. at 566, in which the holder of a license to sell drugs and
medicines is resisting the application of laws governing the retail sale of alcohol to his store.
150. State v. Gilbert, 24 Mo. 380 (1857); State v. Joe, 19 Mo. 223 (1853); Nathan v. State,
8 Mo. 631 (1844); Lucy v. State, 8 Mo. 134 (1843); Fanny v. State, 6 Mo. 122 (1839); Mary v. State,
5 Mo. 71 (1837); Jim v. State, 3 Mo. 108 (1832); Jane v. State, 3 Mo. 45 (1831); State v. Henry,
2 Mo. 178 (1830); Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 135 (1829).
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relevant.151 The evident purpose of these documents was to alert the court to
the subjects that would be addressed in oral argument, which was the real
heart of the proceeding. Missouri Supreme Court practice provided for more
than two hours of argument for each case. 152 In old Missouri, even appellate
work was primarily an exercise in oral advocacy.
Which brings us back to John Chapman, facing his mortal end in four
weeks despite the thunderous declamations and heart-wrenching perorations
of his Dream Team. Someone had enough money to retain not one, but four,
lawyers for Chapman‘s defense. And even if the money was exhausted after
the trial, the impending execution loomed to inspire further exertions on the
condemned client‘s behalf. Between them, these lawyers had the money,
time, facilities, and incentive to prepare a writ of error and bill of exceptions.
In Columbia, they had access to the books, and though perhaps not appellate
specialists, they were not complete novices. Prior to 1858, Guitar or his firm
had appeared before the supreme court twice and his defense colleague,
Andrew Herndon, once, 153 albeit in civil cases.154 They were plainly prepared
to ride the thirty miles from Columbia to the state capital in Jefferson City to
argue the case.
The fact that not even these lawyers could get a full hearing on the merits
from the Missouri Supreme Court in a capital case surprises us, but it was, I
think, consistent with the legal spirit of the times. Criminal lawyers in old
Missouri would happily split hairs over the wording of an indictment or the
jurisdiction of the trial court, but the pervasive hyperproceduralism that,
depending on your point of view, either protects or infects modern law did not
exist. To Rollins and Guitar and their brethren practicing before the war, the
idea of a fair trial implied one good, thorough airing of the facts before a local
judge and jury, with ample opportunity for the lawyers to exercise their
rhetorical gifts. If the indictment charged the right crime, no egregious
evidentiary errors of inclusion or exclusion occurred, and the jury received
reasonably correct instructions on the law, that was satisfactory. The notion
of procedurally perfect justice with multiple layers of fine-grained review
would, I think, have seemed an extravagance to them, at least in any case
151. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 18 Mo. 419, 422 (1853) (including the brief of P.R. Hayden for
the appellant consisting of five numbered declarative statements and one citation of authority); State
v. Leapfoot, 19 Mo. 375, 375–76 (1854) (including briefs of both the attorney general and defense
counsel, the attorney general‘s brief consisting of four sentences and citation of four cases, and
defense counsel‘s brief consisting of three sentences and two citations of authority).
152. See, e.g., G.A. FINKELNBURG & TYRRELL WILLIAMS, PRACTICE IN THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MISSOURI IN APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS AND ORIGINAL WRITS 258
(2d ed. 1906) (noting that, as late as 1906, the practice was ―to allow an hour and a half to each side,
without permitting any separate preliminary statement of the case as was formerly the custom‖).
153. Thompson v. Botts, 8 Mo. 710 (1844).
154. Pearson v. Inlow, 20 Mo. 322 (1855); Northcutt v. Northcutt, 20 Mo. 266 (1855).
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where the stake was much less than life itself. And even in such a case, the
executioner‘s hand would not be stayed for any but the most palpable legal
error.
III. AUTRES TEMPS, AUTRES MOEURS:
CRIMINAL APPEALS DURING AND AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
In 1861, the low-grade irregular conflict between pro- and anti-slavery
forces that had plagued the Kansas–Missouri border throughout the 1850s
exploded into national civil war. From the parochial perspective of the
criminal appellate lawyer, however, the war changed less than might have
been expected, despite some dramatic changes in personnel at the supreme
court. In 1861, once pro-Union forces took control of the state, evicted its
secessionist governor and legislators, and created a unionist provisional
government, the three judges of the Missouri Supreme Court, all of whom
were southern in sympathy, resigned rather than take the loyalty oath required
of all state officeholders.155 They were promptly replaced by three reliable,
but conservative, Union men—Barton Bates, William V.N. Bay, and John
D.S. Dryden156—who also won a special election in November 1863 to keep
their seats.157 During the war, overt southern sympathizers being either in
exile, fighting for the Confederacy, or disqualified from public life by the
loyalty oath, the state‘s political hierarchy was divided between Conservative
and Radical unionists. The latter gained control of the state convention in
1865. Anticipating opposition to emancipation and other measures thought
necessary as the war drew to a close, they pushed through an ordinance
ousting all the judicial officers in the state, with the vacant offices to be filled
by gubernatorial appointment. 158 Governor Fletcher appointed David Wagner,
Walter L. Lovelace, and Nathaniel Holmes to the vacancies, though Judges
Bay and Dryden had to be arrested and forcibly removed from the supreme
court bench before the transition could be effected. 159
Despite all the turmoil, the court kept churning out opinions, civil and
criminal, throughout the war at only slightly less than its usual pace. It issued
eight criminal opinions in 1861, thirteen in 1862, eight in 1863, fifteen in
1864, and fourteen in 1865. There are some indications that local legal
institutions were understandably reluctant to be too aggressive in pursuing
perpetrators of personal violence in a period dominated by bushwhacking and
155. D.A. Divilbiss, The Ousting of the Judges, 1 MO. SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 1, 2 (1986).
William Scott, William B. Napton, and Ephraim B. Ewing resigned. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 3. See also State v. Bernoudy, 36 Mo. 279, 279 (1865) (discussing the ousting
ordinance in relation to the elected recorder of St. Louis County).
159. Divilbiss, supra note 155, at 4–5.
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revenge killing. 160 But in reading the substance of the supreme court‘s
decisions, one would almost never have known there was a war on. Other
than a few cases relating to the administration of loyalty oaths, 161 perhaps the
most notable clue that something was amiss was the delay in rendering
decisions.162
When the war ended, however, changes in the judicial system followed
thick and fast. A new state constitution adopted in 1865 reinstituted the same
three-judge supreme court, but also created district courts of appeals, to be
composed of panels of circuit court judges. 163 These intermediate courts were
apparently unpopular and were abolished in 1870.164 However, in 1872 the
membership of the supreme court was increased to five, and the constitutional
amendment of 1890 increased it to seven; an earlier constitutional amendment
in 1884 authorized three intermediate courts of appeals to sit in different
sections of the state. 165 The courts of appeals had jurisdiction over all appeals
from felony convictions.166
The result of these changes, in combination with the restoration of civil
order and the growth in the state‘s population and industrial and commercial
base,167 was a rapid increase in the incidence of criminal appeals. By 1875,
the five-member Missouri Supreme Court was deciding nearly forty criminal
appeals per year. The increase in both its civil and criminal docket was so
great that, by the mid-1870s, the court‘s docket was two years behind. 168 The
addition of the courts of appeals authorized by the 1875 constitution pushed
the number of criminal appeals above fifty annually. 169 By 1885, the number
160. In Boone County, for example, it is said that one judge ―held court in Columbia several
times during the Civil War . . . with two pistols buckled around his waist. Although it was known
that men were being killed, houses burned and property stolen, it was considered best not to indict
nor even to investigate. Circuit court was adjourned for one whole year during this war.‖ GENTRY,
supra note 1, at 266.
161. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, 263 (1865) (concerning charges that a pastor
had carried on his ministering trade without taking the required loyalty oath).
162. See, e.g., State v. Edwards, 36 Mo. 394, 394 (1865) (deciding an appeal arising from an
1859 receiving stolen goods indictment); State v. Jenkins, 36 Mo. 372, 374 (1865) (resolving issues
in an 1862 robbery).
163. Hyde, supra note 61, at 4.
164. Id. at 5.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 1 Mo. App. at v. (1877).
169. In 1876, Missouri appellate courts decided fifty-six criminal appeals, seventy-five in 1877,
fifty-one in 1878, and fifty-two in 1879. By 1885, the number of criminal appeals reached sixtyfour. Interestingly, the addition of the courts of appeals does not seem to have materially reduced the
supreme court‘s overall backlog. In January 1883, the Court had 1,404 undecided cases on its
docket. Norwin D. Houser, Missouri Supreme Court Commissioners, 1882–1885 and 1911–1982,
1 MO. SUPREME CT. HIST. J. 2 (1986).
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of criminal appellate decisions reached sixty-four, and the advent of a
statewide system of shorthand reporters in 1887 170 seems to have had its
effect, as well, with the number of annual decisions exceeding eighty in 1888
and succeeding years.
The new fashion for criminal appellate practice did not leave our friends
in Boone County entirely behind. In around 1869, a Hallsville, Missouri,
physician, Dr. Thomas H. Keene, got into a dispute with one Peter Evans, 171
who, for reasons lost to history, was violently angry that Keene was engaged
to marry a niece of Evans‘ wife.172 So enraged was Evans that ―he violently
assaulted [Keene] with a pistol and knife, and swore that he would kill him,
and that nothing but his blood would satisfy him.‖173 Although Keene
escaped, ―Evans renewed his threats; declared that he would make no
compromise in reference to the matter; that he would kill defendant on sight,
if it was the last act of his life. These threats were communicated to defendant
the same evening.‖174 The next day, Keene encountered Evans again,
whereupon Evans repeated his determination to kill Keene. Evans was
struggling with some other men who were trying to restrain him, when Keene
shot and killed him. Keene was charged with second-degree murder. He
retained Odon Guitar. At trial, the evidence of Evans‘ prior threats to kill
Keene was excluded, and despite the no-doubt-stirring oratory of Guitar on
his behalf, Keene was convicted and sentenced to sixteen years in the
penitentiary.175
Once again, Guitar was not surrendering without fighting all the way to
the top. Whether because of his own increased appellate experience 176 or the
changed Missouri legal environment or simply having better facts, Guitar
accomplished for Keene what he and Rollins could not for John Chapman.
Guitar first appealed to the newly created district court of appeals, but
apparently was unable to secure an opinion before that court was abolished in
1870.177 He then brought an appeal to the Missouri Supreme Court, arguing
that exclusion of the prior threat evidence was error. The court agreed and
170. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
171. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 237–38.
172. State v. Keene, 50 Mo. 357, 358 (1872).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 358–59.
176. Beginning around 1860, with an interruption caused by the war, Guitar and his partners
had started to appear more regularly in appeals. See, e.g., Keene v. Barnes, 29 Mo. 377 (1860);
Williams v. Christian Female Coll., 29 Mo. 250 (1860); Wright v. Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389 (1860);
Singleton v. Boone County Home Mut. Ins. Co., 45 Mo. 250 (1870); Hume v. Wainscott, 46 Mo. 145
(1870); Mathews v. Switzler, 46 Mo. 301 (1870); Head v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 47 Mo. 220
(1871).
177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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reversed the conviction.178 Armed with the excluded evidence, Guitar won
the retrial and Keene walked free. 179 In a macabre postscript, in 1876, on
almost exactly the same spot where Keene killed Evans, Keene himself was
shot and killed by another Hallsville physician named Benjamin Austine as a
result of a dispute over an anonymous circular letter. Austine hired Guitar,
who secured his acquittal for the murder of Guitar‘s former client, this time
without recourse to an appeal.180

178. State v. Keene, 50 Mo. 357, 358, 361 (1872).
179. GENTRY, supra note 1, at 238.
180. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
I have indulged in this antiquarian excursion into nineteenth-century
criminal practice with the entirely frivolous aim of trying to inhabit, at least
for awhile, the world of my professional predecessors in the little town where
I live. I wasn‘t seeking, and can‘t say I found, any profound lessons or deep
insights. But if forced to stretch for some generalizations about what I have
learned, I might offer two.
First, it is striking to realize the degree to which our modern American
legal system depends on the existence of a complex physical and intellectual
infrastructure—a body of existing case law covering a broad range of topics
reproduced in a form quickly and easily accessible to lawyers, courthouse
buildings sheltering judges and books so the one can find the other when
required, a cadre of court reporters to generate the verbatim transcripts from
which appellate arguments are woven, and so forth—that we take for granted,
but which took decades to create on the American frontier. The absence of
any of element of this infrastructure narrows the scope and changes the style
of appellate review. And restricted appellate oversight in turn alters the
nature of trial practice. If there is any practical lesson to be drawn from this
observation, it might be in the international realm. The experience of
nineteenth-century Missouri suggests that those seeking to foster the rule of
law in the developing world must learn patience with systems which, despite a
patina of modernity, may operate in ways not much different than 1850s
Boone County.
Second, we should, on balance, be deeply thankful for the well-developed
system of criminal appeals we now possess. The availability to every
defendant of at least one thorough second look over the facts and legal rulings
that produced his conviction is an indispensable element of a fair system of
criminal justice. That said, I am left to wonder just a little bit. Old-time
Missouri criminal appeals in the bill-of-exceptions era necessarily focused on
the big stuff. Major errors of law. Manifest failures by the government to
prove its case. The system relied on trial judges, lawyers, and local juries to
sort out everything else. And, always assuming the availability of at least one
appeal to look carefully and impartially at the big questions, I am not sure this
approach is inferior to our own.
Years ago, when I was a working prosecutor and long before I became an
academic, I started to write my very first law review article goaded by a
Colorado appellate decision that found a prosecutor‘s characterization of a
defendant‘s testimony as ―lies‖ to be misconduct. I never finished the article
(which was probably just as well), but the sense of annoyed wonderment
remains that appellate judges would seriously contemplate forcing lawyers,
trial judges, juries, witnesses, and victims to retry a case due to a choice of
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words that did not comport with the appellate bench‘s elevated sense of verbal
decorum. 181 Just before going off to attend the symposium on which this issue
of the law review is based, I came across a scholarly paper that took as its
starting point the rulings of a few trial judges across the country banning the
use in court by witnesses and counsel of assertedly inflammatory terms such
as ―victim,‖ ―rape,‖ ―homicide,‖ ―drunk,‖ ―murderer,‖ ―killer,‖ and ―crime
scene.‖182 The article reports the results of an empirical study attempting to
determine whether use of the word ―victim‖ to describe victims affects trial
outcomes.183 While not even the author of this paper maintains that the use of
such words is a big issue in many courts, for a modern legal academic—and
obviously for some judges—minute scrutiny of the potential deleterious trial
impact of participant word choices does not seem altogether strange.
I strongly suspect that James Rollins and Odon Guitar would have thought
everyone involved in such discussions—judges, lawyers, academics, the lot—
completely mad. And I suspect they would have felt at least considerable
puzzlement over a great many other abstruse issues that now consume the
attention of the criminal appellate bench and bar. I would not want to live
under the Missouri system of the mid-1800s, particularly if I were a
defendant, and even more particularly if I were non-white. But I am not
entirely sure that in the vast majority of cases our incredibly intricate, detailobsessed appellate process is any better at doing substantial justice than the
courts of old Missouri. So, with all their flaws, I lift a glass to the shades of
Rollins and Guitar, Lancaster and Herndon, Williams and Prewitt haunting, as
I imagine they do, the courthouses that were once their stages and whispering
eloquent closing speeches to rapt spectral throngs.

181. The ―liar‖ controversy lingers. See, e.g., Claire Gagnon, Note, A Liar by Any Other
Name? Iowa’s Closing Argument Conundrum, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 471 (2007).
182. Christopher Terranova, Loaded Words in the Courtroom 2 & n.4 (May 12, 2009) (working
paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1403627.
183. Id. at 3.

